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Data protection in the European Union (EU) seems to be at its peak. Data protection has been 
recognised as a fundamental right alongside the right to privacy;1 it has been modernised to 
face the information technology-driven challenges of the 21st century through the adoption of 
the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR);2 and, the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) 
has delivered a series of seminal decisions that mark a significant vindication of data privacy 
vis-à-vis modern electronic surveillance techniques,3 confirm the extraterritorial application 
of EU data privacy rights,4 and show big technology companies (big tech) such as Google and 
Facebook that they cannot operate in a human-rights free zone in the EU.5 Primary and 
secondary data protection law is surrounded by an impressive amount of soft law, reports, 
guidelines and recommendations by independent authorities and bodies specialising on data 
protection both at the national (the Data Protection Authorities or DPAs) and at the EU level, 
the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) and the European Data Protection Board 
(EDPB). EU data protection law (both hard and soft) is further complemented by an even 
more impressively rich legal academic scholarship that spans across several hundreds of EU 
data protection books and textbooks, thousands of journal articles including a journal 
dedicated to EU data protection law,6 data privacy studies, blogposts and data protection 
conferences and workshops. 
 
1 Article 8 of the European Union Charter of Fundamental Right (EUCFR). Maria Tzanou, 
The Fundamental Right to Data Protection: Normative Value in the Context of Counter-
Terrorism Surveillance (Hart Publishing, 2017).  
2 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 
on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on 
the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (GDPR) [2016] OJ L 
119/1. 
3 Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12 Digital Rights Ireland, EU:C:2014:238. 
4 Case C-362/14 Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner, EU:C:2015:650. 
5 Case C-131/12 Google Spain SL, EU:C:2014:317.  
6 European Data Protection Law Review (EDPL).  
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 If data protection law seems to be currently living its best moment, how will the future 
of EU data protection look? Most would answer this question by looking at the technological 
challenges data protection is facing. How can data privacy address big data, Artificial 
Intelligence (AI) and other data-driven technologies? Is data protection law becoming 
outdated due to rapid technological change?  
Not underestimating the importance of technological challenges for the future of data 
protection, I wish to introduce a novel argument. If EU data protection law wishes to remain 
relevant in the future, mainstream EU data protection narratives need to be extended to 
include largely ignored data privacy problems affecting marginalised groups. This article 
submits that the future priorities of EU data protection law should not be technology driven. 
Rather than trying to catch up with new technologies, I call for a shift of the current focus of 
EU data privacy law from technological problems to societal problems of situationally 
disadvantaged parties that tend to go unremarked. In this respect, this article argues that the 
future focus of EU data protection law should be in developing an egalitarian EU data 
privacy law. 
The analysis proceeds as follows: Section II outlines the contemporary popular 
narrative of EU data protection law and highlights its limitations. Section III “What the 
Contemporary EU Data Protection Narrative Has Overlooked”, explores the importance of 
broadening the methodological debates surrounding EU data protection law by discussing two 
case studies — poor people’s and women’s data privacy — and addressing questions of 
intersectionality in the light of the recent System for Risk Indication “SyRI” case. Section IV 
addresses the future of EU data privacy law and proposes a project of egalitarian EU data 
protection law. Section V offers brief conclusions. 
 
II. The Contemporary Focus of EU Data Protection Law 
 
The current focus of EU data protection law can be characterised as technology driven and 
Court centred.  
 
A. Technology-driven law 
 
 4 
The emergence and evolution of EU data protection is closely linked to the growing potential 
of information and communication technology (ICT).7 The first EU legislative instrument on 
data protection, the Data Protection Directive (DPD) noted that “progress (…) in information 
technology” made the processing and exchange of personal data considerably easier.8 Article 
8 of the European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights (EUCFR) elevated data protection to 
the status of a fundamental right in the EU prompting commentators to applaud the inclusion 
of a 21st-century technology right in EU’s primary law. The current centrepiece EU data 
protection legislation, the GDPR, is also vocal of its aims to address technological challenges9 
and contains a series of substantive provisions that concern the impact of new technologies on 
personal data processing. For instance, it imposes an obligation on controllers to undertake a 
data protection impact assessment (DPIA) “where a type of processing in particular using new 
technologies, (…) is likely to result in a high risk to the rights and freedoms of natural 
persons”10  and attempts “to address the risks arising from profiling and automated decision-
making”.11 Finally, the proposed ePrivacy Regulation will replace the ePrivacy Directive12 as 
the latter “has not kept pace with technological developments, resulting in a void of protection 
of communications conveyed through new services”.13  
 
7 Lee Bygrave, Data Privacy Law: An International Perspective (Oxford University Press, 
2014) pp.8–9.  
8 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on 
the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data [1995] OJ L 281/31 Recital 4 and art.33.  
9 See Recital 6 of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).  
10 Article 35(1) of the GDPR.  
11 Article 29 Working Party Guidelines on Automated individual decision-making and 
Profiling for the purposes of Regulation 2016/679, 6. 
12 Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 
concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic 
communications sector (Directive on Privacy and Electronic Communications) [2002] OJ L 
201/37. 
13 Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
concerning the respect for private life and the protection of personal data in electronic 
 
 5 
 The CJEU has also adopted a technology-driven interpretation of data protection law. 
In this respect, it often cautions about the capabilities of new technologies and how these 
touch upon the fundamental rights to privacy and data protection. According to the Court, the 
effect of the interference with the fundamental rights to privacy and data protection is 
“heightened on account of the important role played by the internet and search engines in 
modern society, which render the information contained in such a list of results ubiquitous”.14 
In Digital Rights Ireland the CJEU annulled the Data Retention Directive15 on the basis that 
this required the retention of all traffic data concerning fixed and mobile telephony and 
Internet access of all subscribers and registered users.  According to the Court such data, 
taken as a whole, is liable to allow “very precise conclusions to be drawn concerning the 
private lives” of individuals, such as “everyday habits, permanent or temporary places of 
residence, daily or other movements, the activities carried out, the social relationships of those 
persons and the social environments frequented by them”.16  
 Academic discourse on data protection is also dominated by problems arising in the 
information age. The ability of data protection law to grasp with questions regarding the 
Internet, big data, ambient technologies, machine learning and AI features prominently in 
academic debates.17  
 There is nothing inherently wrong with the technological-driven focus of data privacy 
law. Data protection rights and interests are particularly pertinent in the information society 
and data protection laws should provide mechanisms to address technological risks. However, 
the perpetual quest of data protection law to catch up with new technologies overshadows 
 
communications and repealing Directive 2002/58/EC (Regulation on Privacy and Electronic 
Communications) (Brussels, 10 January 2017) COM (2017) 10 final, 2.  
14 Google Spain SL, EU:C:2014:317 [80].  
15 Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 on 
the retention of data generated or processed in connection with the provision of publicly 
available electronic communications services or of public communications networks and 
amending Directive 2002/58/EC [2006] OJ L105/54. 
16 Digital Rights Ireland, EU:C:2014:238 [27]. 
17 See Tal Zarsky, “The Trouble with Algorithmic Decisions: An Analytic Road Map to 
Examine Efficiency and Fairness in Automated and Opaque Decision Making” (2016) 41 
Science, Technology, & Human Values 118. 
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other problems that data protection should be concerning itself with. By putting technology 
and the power imbalances this creates as its main focus, the popular data protection narrative 
has paid little attention to various data privacy inequalities disproportionally burdening 
marginalised populations. The obsession to address through EU data protection law the latest 
technological hype — be that AI or big data — is problematic. As Koops has rightly argued 
this ends up stretching the concept of personal data “sometimes to the point of breaking, or 
perhaps rather of becoming void of meaning”, or stretching the regulatory problem so that it 
becomes a problem of processing personal data.18 I argue that this focus may be motivated by 
selective interests as well. It seems that data protection is asked to deal predominantly with 
problems that affect the average and elite individuals.19 These often concern themselves with 
the knowledge and power asymmetries that new technologies impose on the many and more 
privileged in our society. The problem is not merely about stretching the boundaries of EU 
data protection law and, thus, possibly turning this into “the law of everything”20 or indeed 
“the law of nothing”; more crucially, the problem is that this law is becoming troublingly 
inegalitarian.  
B. CJEU-centred law 
 
The CJEU’s case law has been a driving force for the development of EU data protection law. 
Indeed, the CJEU has not just had a saying in clarifying the scope of this law, by explaining 
the meaning of concepts such as “personal” and “sensitive” data, “processing” and 
“adequacy” of protection for international data transfers; it has consistently interpreted an 
internal market harmonisation instrument (the DPD) in a manner that fosters the protection of 
fundamental rights by distancing it from its economic objectives.21 More recently, the CJEU 
 
18 Bert-Jaap Koops, “The Trouble with European Data Protection Law” (2014) 4(4) 
International Data Privacy Law, 250, 258.  
19 See Mary Anne Franks, “Democratic Surveillance” (2017) 30 Harvard Journal of Law and 
Technology 425. 
20 Nadezhda Purtova, “The Law of Everything: Broad Concept of Personal Data and Future of 
EU Data Protection Law” (2018) 10 Law, Innovation and Technology 40.  
21 Maria Tzanou, “Balancing Fundamental Rights: United in Diversity? Some Reflections on 
the Recent Case-Law of the European Court of Justice on Data Protection” (2010) 6 Croatian 
Yearbook of European Law and Policy 53. 
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sometimes went “beyond the limits of interpretation” and manipulated the texts22 to create a 
“super” fundamental right to data privacy23 that could “effectively make the entire Internet 
subject to EU data protection law”.24   
 Much as the CJEU’s data privacy jurisprudence still continues to surprise, what is 
important for the present analysis is that it sets the agenda and monopolises the mainstream 
EU data protection debates. Data protection issues considered by the CJEU are the topics that 
mostly preoccupy EU data privacy scholars. Arguably, these issues are far from unimportant 
— after all they might concern the EU’s digital domination over the whole Internet — but the 
foregrounding of the CJEU’s case law in data privacy scholarship raises questions of what 
Gestel and Micklitz have called “herd behaviour”, namely researchers “choose to follow ‘hot 
topics’ and trends”,25 such as these coming before the CJEU.  
As in the case of new technologies, this is again dangerously limiting the focus of the 
EU data privacy debate. EU judges are bound to decide on the particular disputes that reach 
them using the interpretative methods they commonly apply.26 Copying these to legal 
scholarship does not merely complicate “a critical assessment of the output” of the Court;27 it 
implies some sort of selection bias that determines what matters are important for EU data 
protection law and which mainstream ideas and methodologies can be used to approach these. 
Furthermore, while EU data privacy scholarship is often very critical of the Court and the 
 
22 Oreste Pollicino, “Data Protection and Freedom of Expression beyond EU Borders: EU 
Judicial Perspectives” in Federico Fabbrini et al (eds) Data Protection Beyond Borders (Hart 
Publishing, 2020 forthcoming).  
23 Google Spain SL, EU:C:2014:317, [81]. 
24 Maria Tzanou, “European Union Regulation of Transatlantic Data Transfers and Online 
Surveillance” (2017) Human Rights Law Review 545, 553.  
25 Rob Gestel and Hans-Wolfgang Micklitz, “Why Methods Matter in European Legal 
Scholarship” (2014) 20 European Law Journal 292, 305.  
26 Daniela Caruso and Fernanda Nicola, “Legal Scholarship and External Critique in EU 
Law” in Tamara Perišin and Siniša Rodin (eds), The Transformation or Reconstitution of 
Europe: The Critical Legal Studies Perspective on the Role of the Courts in the European 
Union (Hart Publishing, 2018) pp. 221, 230.  
27 Gestel and Micklitz, “Why Methods Matter in European Legal Scholarship” (n 25) 299. 
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consequences — intended or unexpected —28 of its judgments, the critique that it voices 
largely focuses on the CJEU’s interpretative results and their flaws and misses broader 
problems that might lead to deficits of substantive justice. Questions on what role EU data 
protection law can play in eliminating privilege, or class, race and sex inequalities29 are 
crucial; yet, these rarely, if ever, reach the CJEU.    
 
 
III. What the Contemporary EU Data Protection Narrative Has Overlooked 
 
The above analysis has demonstrated that there is a hierarchy in EU data privacy problems: 
those that concern the latest technological innovation and questions that arise from the 
CJEU’s case-law attract more attention. The problem, however, is that this technologically 
driven, CJEU-centred focus of EU data protection law has not bothered to concern itself with 
the fundamental question: Data protection for whom? Are only the interests, experiences and 
problems of the relatively privileged members of society that matter? Are data privacy law 
outcomes equally distributed? What are the issues that the more vulnerable and disadvantaged 
face in this respect?  
This section takes a closer look at examples of what I argue has been left behind by 
the mainstream EU data protection law narrative: poor people’s and women’s data privacy. 
 
A. Poor people’s data privacy 
 
In his Report to the United Nations (UN) General Assembly, the Special Rapporteur on 
extreme poverty and human rights, Professor Philip Alston details the emergence of the 
“digital welfare state”.30 Systems of social protection and assistance worldwide,31 including in 
 
28 Maria Tzanou, “The Unexpected Consequences of the EU Right to Be Forgotten” in Maria 
Tzanou (ed), Personal Data Protection and Legal Developments in the European Union (IGI 
Global, 2020) p.279. 
29 Caruso and Nicola, “Legal Scholarship and External Critique in EU Law” (n 26) p.230.  
30 Report of the Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights, 11 October 2019, 
A/74/493.  
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many EU countries, (commonly known as the “welfare state”) that provide a range of 
government services and goods to underprivileged persons, such as low-income individuals, 
job-seekers and persons with disabilities are increasingly employing digital technologies to 
“automate, predict, identify, surveil, detect, target, harass and punish” their beneficiaries, 
“especially the poorest and most vulnerable among them”.32 Digital innovation is used by the 
welfare state to verify the identity of benefits applicants (requiring often the retention of 
biometric data); assess their eligibility; calculate payments benefits; prevent and detect 
welfare fraud; and, calculate risks. In the Report, the Special Rapporteur laments that: 
 
unrestricted data-matching is used to expose and punish the slightest irregularities in 
the record of welfare beneficiaries (while assiduously avoiding such measures in 
relation to the well-off); evermore refined surveillance options enable around-the-
clock monitoring of beneficiaries; conditions are imposed on recipients that undermine 
individual autonomy and choice in relation to sexual and reproductive choices and 
choices in relation to food, alcohol, drugs and much else; and highly punitive 
sanctions are able to be imposed on those who step out of line.33 
 
It is hardly new or surprising that the poor are subjected to surveillance. Indeed, the 
poor have sustained for years pervasive surveillance of their bodies, habits, decisions and 
homes (or the lack thereof).34 For instance, the homeless have since long been criminalised 
for engaging in “activities that would be perfectly legal inside a home: standing or sitting in 
one place for long periods of time, sleeping, drinking alcohol, and engaging in sexual 
activity”.35  
 What is perhaps more perversely remark worthy about the emergence of the “digital 
welfare state” is the inherent assumption that the poor are not entitled to data privacy either. 
 
31 On the United States, see Virginia Eubanks, Automating Inequality: How High-Tech Tools 
Profile, Police, and Punish the Poor (St Martin’s Press, 2018). 
32 Report of the Special Rapporteur (n 30) para.63. 
33 Ibid., para.77. 
34 Robin Morris Collin and Robert William Collin, “Are the Poor Entitled to Privacy?” (1991) 
8 Harvard Blackletter Journal 181. 
35 Franks, “Democratic Surveillance” (n 19) 444.  
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The design of the digital welfare system imposes an additional layer of surveillance on poor 
people, this time a digital one. It requires that they become visible as data points of 
observation if they wish to be part of this. It is not just that social services beneficiaries are 
“effectively forced to give up their data privacy rights to receive their right to social 
security”;36 their condition as being poor and vulnerable denies them any entitlement to data 
privacy from the outset. Indeed, their condition of being poor implies that the welfare state 
can single them out; object them to constant monitoring and surveillance; compile and hold 
databases on them storing personal information they are required to provide; interconnect 
government data silos and private-sector databases to match this information with further 
data; score risks on the ways they lead their lives; and even “try to alter social behaviours, 
such as sexual activity or preferences, approaches to cohabitation, (…) and the decision to 
have children”.37 
What’s more, this is hardly seen as extraordinary; in fact, it is the (new?) normal. As 
the Special Rapporteur eloquently observes “because of the relative deprivation and 
powerlessness of many welfare recipients, conditions, demands and forms of intrusiveness are 
imposed that would never be accepted if they were piloted in programmes applicable to 
better-off members of the community instead”.38  
The issue of benefit fraud is particularly illuminating in this respect. Benefits 
claimants are often perceived as “cheats” or “scroungers”39 and suspected of defrauding the 
state.40 Cracking down on benefit fraud is, therefore, considered a legitimate public interest 
objective. In the United Kingdom, the Cabinet Office conducts every two years the National 
 
36 Report of the Special Rapporteur (n 30) para.64. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid., para.6.  
39 David Garland, The Welfare State: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford University Press, 
2016).  
40 Brief by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights as 
Amicus Curiae in the case of NJCM cs/ De Staat der Nederlanden (SyRI) before the District 
Court of The Hague, para.22.  
 11 
Fraud Initiative (NFI), a massive data matching exercise that amasses data41 from 1,200 
organisations from the public and private sectors including government departments and 
combines them to identify “potentially fraudulent claims and benefits” in a broad range of 
areas, including housing benefits, council tax, social housing applications, pension fraud and 
blue badges.42  
In the Netherlands, the Dutch government has taken various measures to punish 
welfare fraud since 2003. For instance, in order to tackle the so-called “living together” 
benefit fraud (a situation where a claimant declares to be living alone to receive a higher 
benefit, yet lives with another person), the “Waterproof” (Waterproef) project implemented 
between 2006 and 2010, matched databases from drinking water companies and public bodies 
containing information on 63,000 welfare beneficiaries receiving a type of benefit intended 
for those who have no other forms of income or assets.43 Water usage was used as a “risk 
indicator” and the system flagged individuals living at certain addresses as “at risk” for 
committing “living together” fraud.  
The more recent System for Risk Indication “SyRI” (Systeem Risico Indicatie) 
follows the same trend. It matches personal data44 from several government silos using a risk 
calculation model to predict the likelihood of an individual committing benefit or tax fraud or 
violating labour laws.45 In a seminal decision delivered in February 2020, the Hague District 
Court found that SyRI breached art.8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 
because it failed to strike a right balance between the benefits the use of new technologies 
 
41 Cabinet Office, Statutory Guidance, National Fraud Initiative privacy notice, Updated 17 
July 2019, <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/fair-processing-national-fraud-
initiative/fair-processing-level-3-full-text> (visited 31 July 2020). 
42 Cabinet Office, National Fraud Initiative Report, 1 April 2016 to 31 March 2018, 
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment
_data/file/737146/National-Fraud-Initiative-Report-2018.pdf> (visited 31 July 2020). 
43 Brief by the United Nations Special Rapporteur (n 40) para.13; Valery Gantchev, “Data 
Protection in the Age of Welfare Conditionality: Respect for Basic Rights or a Race to the 
Bottom?” (2019) 21 European Journal of Social Security 3.  
44 On the data used see Hague District Court, SyRI, NL:RBDHA:2020:865, Decision of 5 
February 2020, [4.17]. 
45 Ibid., [4.23]. 
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bring as regards the prevention and combating fraud on the one hand, and the potential 
interference with the exercise of the right to respect for private life through such technological 
use on the other hand.46  
It is worth taking a closer look at three points of the District court’s analysis that are 
relevant to the present discussion. First, it is worth remarking that while the court decided the 
case on the basis of art.8(2) of the ECHR, the bulk of its analysis focused on what can be 
characterised as “data protection problems”. In particular, the court considered three data 
protection principles, the principles of transparency, purpose limitation and data minimisation 
and, on the basis of these, it found that the legislation pertaining to the application of SyRI 
was “insufficiently transparent and verifiable”.47 This confirms that data protection law is 
central for the assessment of systems of risk calculation models. Second, questions about new 
technologies occupied a large part of the court’s analysis. Having noted that the State has a 
“special responsibility when applying new technologies”,48 the Dutch court embarked, upon 
the applicants’ request, to examine whether SyRI involved a “dragnet, untargeted approach, 
data mining, ‘deep learning’, ‘big data’; and whether it entailed profiling and automated 
decision-making”.49 In this regard, the court noted that due to the speed of technological 
development, “the right to data protection is becoming increasingly important”.50  
While highlighting the importance of data protection in the face of new technologies, 
the court failed to recognise the discriminatory impact that welfare fraud detection schemes 
impose on the poorer and more vulnerable in the society. The imposition of an additional 
layer of surveillance without any cause of suspicion only on a particular segment of the 
population was not considered as such problematic for the right to data protection. Indeed, it 
is worth remarking that according to the Hague District court:  
 
the starting point is that social security is one of the pillars of Dutch society and 
contributes to a considerable extent to prosperity in the Netherlands… The social 
security system can only function if citizens in the Netherlands who are not eligible 
 
46 Ibid., [6.6]. 
47 Ibid., [6.7].  
48 Ibid., [6.84].  
49 Ibid., [6.46]–[6.65]. 
50 Ibid., [6.85].  
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for such facilities do not make use of them. The system is financed with public money 
and fraud affects the solidarity underlying the system. Combating fraud is therefore 
key to maintain citizen support for the system.51 
  
General citizen support for the welfare system seems, therefore, to be a rationale put forward 
by the mainstream society (indeed by the State) to tolerate — or even encourage — the 
surveillance of the poor.52 Besides being carried out with no previous suspicious of fraud and 
detecting very few such cases (under the “Waterproof” project 42 benefit frauds were 
detected overall, amounting to 0.07 per cent), the case of the welfare fraud demonstrates the 
disparate impact of data privacy. Poor peoples’ data privacy clearly does not matter enough; 
this can be denied altogether in the name of detecting benefit fraud. The problem, is not, 
therefore, that such measures violate several data protection principles and rules, such as 
purpose limitation, data minimisation, etc.; the problem is that they turn the very concept of 
data protection on its head. Benefits claimants are not allowed the data privacy the non-
claimants enjoy because they might commit fraud. The poorest and more vulnerable in the 
society are once again seen as “second-class” citizens; this time, with regard to their data 
privacy rights. 
 Combatting benefit fraud at the national level is not the only example of the disparate 
impact of data privacy protections afforded to the vulnerable. At the EU level, the EU 
operates a “mille-feuille” of databases53 that are purposefully designed to monitor third-
 
51 Ibid., [6.3] (emphasis added). 
52 The court noted that while it was correct to date that SyRI had only been applied to so-
labelled “problem districts”, “this in and of itself need not imply that such use is 
disproportionate or otherwise contrary to Article 8 paragraph 2 ECHR in all cases”. However, 
it observed that “given the large amounts of data that qualify for processing in SyRI, … and 
the circumstance that risk profiles are used, there is in fact a risk that SyRI inadvertently 
creates links based on bias, such as a lower socio-economic status or an immigration 
background”. Ibid., [6.93]. 
53 Niovi Vavoula, “The ‘Puzzle’ of EU Large-Scale Information Systems for Third-Country 
Nationals: Surveillance of Movement and Its Challenges for Privacy and Personal Data 
Protection” (2020) 45(3) European Law Review 348, 349.  
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country nationals (TCNs) and designate them in “risk groups”54 in order to sort them out 
“between bona fide and mala fide and to assign levels of danger”.55 The EU’s “smart borders” 
are used to enable the dehumanisation of migrants on basis of preventative security measures 
that treat them as suspects per se.56  
 While the Snowden revelations about mass digital surveillance might have created a 
“chilling effect” in the exercise of the fundamental rights to privacy and freedom of 
expression of the majority, the harms to the poor and vulnerable from surveillance regimes 
imposed only onto them go far beyond a “chilling effect”. As pointed out by Madden et al, 
many surveillance systems targeting the poor “are purposefully designed to deliver a message 
of stigma to the subject while reinforcing societal stereotypes about dependency”.57 
Discriminatory and punitive laws, combined with the threat of sanctions, directed at the poor 
and vulnerable exacerbate long-term health conditions and negatively affect mental health.58  
 To sum up, it seems that data privacy has a differential impact. It is not equitably 
applicable to everyone; its application depends on personal conditions: the more socio-
economically disadvantaged groups are de facto expected to have diminished data privacy. 
Lower levels of data privacy protection are deemed acceptable in contexts of state support and 
intervention. But these do not apply to “regular” citizens who remain outside these systems. 
In this respect, data privacy is no longer a right that all can enjoy. It instead turns to a 
 
54 Didier Bigo, “Globalized (In)Security: The Field and the Ban-Opticon” in Didier Bigo and 
Anastassia Tsoukala (eds), Terror, Insecurity and Liberty: Illiberal Practices of Liberal 
Regimes after 9/11 (Routledge, 2008) 10. 
55 Vavoula, “The ‘Puzzle’ of EU Large-Scale Information Systems for Third-Country 
Nationals: Surveillance of Movement and Its Challenges for Privacy and Personal Data 
Protection” (n 53) 366.  
56 Valsamis Mitsilegas, The Criminalisation of Migration in Europe: Challenges for Human 
Rights and the Rule of Law (Springer, 2015).  
57 Mary Madden et al, “Privacy, Poverty, and Big Data: A Matrix of Vulnerabilities for Poor 
Americans” (2017) 95 Washington University Law Review 53, 61.  
58 Mandy Cheetham et al, “Impact of Universal Credit in North East England: A Qualitative 
Study of Claimants and Support Staff” (2019) British Medical Journal Open 9:e029611; 
Sophie Wickham et al, “Effects on Mental Health of a UK Welfare Reform, Universal Credit: 
A Longitudinal Controlled Study” (2020) Lancet Public Health 5:e157. 
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“privilege” that is distributed depending on who has the means to afford it.59 This is what I 
call the socio-economic exception of data privacy.  
 
B. Women’s data privacy 
 
Women have throughout the history experienced diminished levels of privacy as their bodies 
have been treated as “property” of their fathers, their husbands, or of men in general.60 
Popular conceptions of privacy have also been criticised by prominent feminists as providing 
“a shield for domestic violence”.61  
Modern technologies have intensified the surveillance of women. Women must now 
navigate “hidden cameras, the possibility of recorded sexual assaults, threats of ‘revenge 
porn’, . . . the proliferation of online mobs engaging in vicious campaigns of sustained 
sexualised abuse”,62 deepfakes63 and so on.64 New forms of surveillance of women’s bodies, 
health and reproductive choices and intimate relations have emerged. Mobile apps and 
wearable devices have been developed to track periods, provide fertility solutions, manage 
pregnancy, contribute to sexual well-being and reproductive healthcare and measure sexual 
 
59 Stacy-Ann Elvy, “Paying for Privacy and the Personal Data Economy” (2017) 117 
Columbia Law Review 1369. 
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1991) p.193; Elizabeth Schneider, “The Violence of Privacy” (1991) 23 Connecticut Law 
Review 973. 
62 Franks, “Democratic Surveillance” (n 19) 447.  
63 Mary Anne Franks and Ari Ezra Waldman, “Sex, Lies, and Videotape: Deep Fakes and 
Free Speech Delusions” (2019) 78 Maryland Law Review 892.  
64 Ian Sample, “Internet ‘Is Not Working for Women and Girls’, says Berners-Lee”, The 
Guardian (12 March 2020) <https://www.theguardian.com/global/2020/mar/12/internet-
not-working-women-girls-tim-berners-lee> (visited 31 July 2020); Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on the right to privacy, 27 February 2019, A/HRC/40/63 para.78.  
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activity and performance. This range of products, services and software often referred to as 
FemTech is considered to deliver important benefits for women, including empowering them 
to assume a more active role in personalised health management and improving overall 
quality of life. While the promise of FemTech is appealing, questions arise about the new 
ways of controlling women. As observed by Lupton: 
 
These devices could . . . be regarded as disciplinary, working to tame the sexual and 
reproductive body by rendering it amenable to monitoring, tracking, and detailed 
analysis of the data thus generated . . .65 
 
Women, their bodies, cycles, communications, relationships and activities are constructed as 
“monitored subjects”66 that can be seduced, coerced, disciplined and controlled.67 A range of 
different actors are involved in the surveillance of women: from the market and private 
entities (such as employers, insurance companies, healthcare providers, advertisers, etc.) to 
intimate partners and ultimately governments.   
Recent examples of women’s intimate surveillance by the market are abundant: From 
the period and ovulation app that was sharing women’s period dates with Facebook; and, the 
use of family-planning apps by employers and health-insurers to control women’s fertility and 
reproductive choices; to revelations that a fertility app with which women share sex and 
menstruation information was funded by US anti-abortion campaigners, we get a disturbing 
glimpse into the complexities of information and power asymmetries of the “surveillance 
capitalism”68 society.   
 A disturbing number of “spy” apps exist with the purpose of surreptitiously gathering 
data about an intimate partner, including reading texts, monitoring social media activity, 
checking contacts, following GPS locations, downloading media files, and even accessing 
 
65 Deborah Lupton, “Quantified Sex: A Critical Analysis of Sexual and Reproductive Self-
Tracking Using Apps” (2014) 17 Culture, Health & Sexuality 440.  
66 Karen Levy, “Intimate Surveillance” (2015) 51 Idaho Law Review 679, 688. 
67 Rob Kitchin, “Thinking Critically about and Researching Algorithms” (2017) 20(1) 
Information, Communication & Society 14, 19.  
68 Shoshana Zuboff, “Big Other: Surveillance Capitalism and the Prospects of an Information 
Civilization” (2015) 30 Journal of Information Technology 75. 
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deleted messages.69 Intimate partner surveillance (IPS) that can also be perpetrated through 
general social media can cause both emotional and physical harm.70 In the most extreme cases 
it can lead to violence, physical assault and even murder.71 IPS and domestic violence 
disproportionately affect women. According to a European Parliament report, one woman in 
three has experienced some form of physical and/or sexual violence and there are 
approximately 3,500 domestic violence-related deaths in the EU every year. This means that 
there are more than nine victims, as many as seven of them women every day and over half of 
all female murder victims are killed by an intimate partner, relative or family member.72  
 Reporting abuse or rape often places women under a further layer of surveillance — 
this time perpetrated by the State. In the United Kingdom, women reporting rape or other 
serious sexual offences are required by the police to hand over their mobile phones to allow 
detectives to search and download call data, messages, email, contacts, apps and Internet 
browsing history.73 The phones of victims can be kept by the police “for several months”.74 
 
69 Lucy Bennett, “10 Free Cheating Spouse App for Android” iLounge (3 February 2020) 
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July 2020). 
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Symposium on Security and Privacy, 441 
<https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=8418618> (visited 31 July 
2020). 
72 Rosamund Shreeves and Martina Prpic, Briefing, Violence against Women in the EU: State 
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73 NPCC, Digital Device Extraction, 29 April 2019 
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(visited 31 July 2020). 
74 NPCC and CPS evidence to the Justice Committee Inquiry into Disclosure in Criminal 
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stice-committee/disclosure-ofevidence-in-criminal-cases/written/80671.pdf> (visited 31 
July 2020). 
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According to the victims’ commissioner for London, such “digital strip searches”75 of sexual 
assault victims might be used to create “character assassinations” of victims and cast doubt on 
their credibility (“victim blaming”), thus, leading to a “high level of victim withdrawals from 
cases and also the increase in police “no further action” and the decline in …charging 
decisions”.76 Furthermore, as the National Police Chiefs’ Council (NPCC) and the Crown 
Prosecution Service (CPS) have recognised “denied access to a telephone could cause serious 
financial and social hardship or risk to personal safety”.77   
 In short, data privacy is also gendered. Women are expected to face new forms of 
digital scrutiny of their bodies, communications, intimate details and habits. They are once 
again judged, disciplined, controlled and subordinated as it is assumed by default that they 
enjoy lower levels of data privacy. This is what I call the gender exception of data privacy.  
 
C. Intersectionality concerns and data privacy 
 
Writing about black women, Kimberle Crenshaw coined the term intersectionality to describe 
how some individuals are “multiply-burdened” and experience “combined effects” of 
discrimination.78 Intersectionality examines how different categories of inequalities, such as 
race, gender, class, ethnicity, disability, sexual orientation and age intersect with each other. 
 
75 Big Brother Watch, “Digital Strip Searches: The Police’s Data Investigation of Victims”, 
July 2019. 
76 Owen Bowcott and Caelainn Barr, “Impact on Rape Victims of Police Phone Seizures to be 
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would be withdrawn by August 2020. Alexandra Topping, “Police and CPS Scrap Digital 
Data Extraction Forms for Rape Cases” The Guardian (16 July 2020) 
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77 NPCC and CPS evidence (n 74).  
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Accounting for intersectionality in the context of the present discussion requires close 
attention to be paid to the complex and compounding harms of different forms of surveillance 
on disadvantaged individuals and the impact on their data privacy.  
 To take another example from the United Kingdom, in response to the 2011 London 
riots, the Metropolitan Police created a so-called “gangs matrix” that compiled a list of 
individuals, giving them a “violence ranking” from green, to amber and red. The matrix 
contained a disproportionate number of poor, young black people (78 per cent)79 when as the 
Amnesty International observes in reality black people are responsible for just 27 per cent of 
serious youth crime.80 Many of the individuals included in the matrix posed “zero risk” of 
causing harm, while some were assessed as being much more likely to be victims than 
offenders.81 Yet, their personal data stored on the gangs matrix were shared with other public 
authorities with the concomitant repercussions (some had their driving licences withdrawn or 
applications denied).82 The gangs matrix problem demonstrates why intersectionality matters 
when considering data protection: race, gender, age, ethnicity and socio-economic status may 
impose multiple layers of surveillance on certain individuals.  
 
 
IV. An Egalitarian EU Data Privacy Project 
 
Addressing the issues identified above requires dealing with large, systemic and deeply rooted 
social ills such as poverty, discrimination, gendered, racial and socio-economic subjugation 
and their multiple and complex underlying causes. These overarching problems can only be 
 
79 Amnesty International UK, “Trapped in the Gangs Matrix” Amnesty International (23 
November 2018) <https://www.amnesty.org.uk/trapped-gangs-
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80 Ibid.  
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The Guardian (15 February 2020) <https://www.theguardian.com/uk-
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addressed by an eradication of the substantive conditions of subordination.83 This article 
engages in a more modest task: it proposes a project of de- and re- construction of EU data 
protection law with the aim of making this more egalitarian. This egalitarian 
reconceptualisation entails a twofold task: (i) to expose the problems of the unarticulated and 
often invisible inequalities of EU data privacy law and recognise the harms these produce (the 
de-construction of EU data privacy law) and (ii) to integrate these problems into current and 
future EU data protection discussions and search for tools to address them by advancing 
substantive equality (the egalitarian re-construction of EU data privacy law).  
  
A. Data privacy law matters 
 
It should be stated from the outset that the task of de-constructing EU data privacy is not one 
of negating or discarding the normative and symbolic significance of this area of law or of the 
relevant fundamental right recognised in art.8 of the EUCFR. It is rather an attempt to re-
configure this to advance substantive equality goals. Indeed, my intention is to suggest future 
improvements for EU data privacy and therefore the starting point of the analysis is to defend 
why this fundamental right matters.   
It has been argued — by American scholars — that data privacy “dominates the way 
most judges and scholars think”,84 and such approach is problematic because it “focuses too 
heavily on information streams…push[ing] arguably higher-stakes privacy invasions to the 
margins and privileges data over bodies”, therefore, obscuring other embodied privacy harms 
and “other, arguably more significant, privacy interests”.85 With the necessary caveats that 
EU privacy law differs from US privacy law and these views describe the US framework 
where privacy protections are sectoral and mainly found in the Fourth Amendment86 and there 
 
83 Kimberlé Crenshaw, “Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation 
in Antidiscrimination Law” (1988) 101 Harvard Law Review 1331, 1341.  
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Amendment” (2014) 102 California Law Review 1069, 1103.  
85 Franks, “Democratic Surveillance” (n 19) 452.  
86 Maria Tzanou, “The War against Terror and Transatlantic Information Sharing: Spillovers 
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is no recognition of separate rights to privacy and data protection,87 I submit that establishing 
hierarchies “of significance” in privacy law is not helpful. Indeed, data privacy is equally 
important as other forms of embodied privacy. Data protection aims to protect from a range of 
information-related harms to the human personality and fosters foundational values such as 
autonomy and human dignity88 which requires that individuals should not be treated as a 
means to an end in their digital lives.89  
Besides the fact that it is becoming increasingly difficult to distinguish “bodies” from 
their “data doubles”90 in the information society, the above case studies illustrate that data 
privacy protections and concerns are crucial for disadvantaged groups. Indeed, the 
surveillance imposed on the unprivileged is “overt” (rather than the covert surveillance 
affecting the whole population), and the harms — psychological, material, and physical — 
suffered by marginalised groups are “concrete” (rather than producing a “chilling effect”).91 
Moreover, “an injury sustained by a disempowered group will lack a name, a history and in 
general a linguistic reality”.92 Fundamental rights matter to the less privileged because they 
signify “the due, the respectful behaviour, the collective responsibility properly owed by a 
 
87 Robert Post, “Data Privacy and Dignitary Privacy: Google Spain, the Right to Be 
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society to one of its own”.93 It is the role of the right to data protection to translate into legal 
reality the surveillance injuries the more disempowered sustain and offer substantive and 
procedural methods to remedy these. The current problem with data privacy is that it is not 
equitably distributed to these groups; and not that it is less significant for vulnerable 
communities compared to the more privileged ones.   
 
B. EU data privacy law should be egalitarian 
 
The project of reconstructing EU data privacy law entails a core normative argument. EU data 
privacy law should be egalitarian: it should be equally distributed to and equally enjoyed by 
all persons. This is necessary for both individual and societal reasons. From the perspective of 
the individuals affected, an unequal data privacy denies them full respect as citizens94 and 
affects their “capacity to live a dignified life”.95 From a societal perspective, such inequalities 
can perpetuate the subordination of whole groups that lack power in society.96 Distinctions 
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between “us” and “them” can reinforce prejudices97 against the more vulnerable. The serious 
curtailments of data protection of disadvantaged groups may ultimately influence “the 
functioning of democracy, since privacy is a core value inherent to a liberal democratic and 
pluralist society” and affect the trust of the less privileged in public institutions and 
corporations.98 
This normative requirement does not extend the scope of EU data protection law. 
Non-discrimination99 has been a core value that data protection laws aim to safeguard,100 and 
scholars have since long commented on the convergence of anti-discrimination and data 
protection law.101 The GDPR states that fair processing requires the prevention of 
“discriminatory effects”102 and acknowledges that there are risks to the rights and freedoms of 
persons which “could lead to physical, material or non-material damage” where “the 
processing may give rise to discrimination”.103  
 Despite these synergies between data protection and anti-discrimination law, however, 
I argue that an egalitarian understanding of data protection is needed as there are several 
problems that, even, an “integrated vision of anti-discrimination and data protection law” 
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cannot resolve.104 This is, first, because the scope of EU anti-discrimination law is limited 
both ratione materiae and ratione personae: only certain persons in the context of certain 
relations105 are protected on the basis of certain grounds. For instance, socio-economic status 
is not a “protected characteristic” under EU anti-discrimination law.106 This means that the 
issues concerning the poor and socially disadvantaged identified above are outside its 
purview. Second, the centre of gravity of the problems discussed in the case studies concerns 
data privacy rather than anti-discrimination law. To put it differently, they are often about the 
disparate impact of surveillance and concomitantly of data protection rather than 
discrimination per se. Data privacy is, therefore, the appropriate forum in principle to discuss 
these problems.    
 A first major implication of the normative assumption of the egalitarian project is that 
data protection should not be used as a legitimising tool for discriminatory kinds of 
processing. In SyRI, the Dutch court assessed the compatibility of benefit fraud detection 
schemes on the basis of certain data protection principles and rules (data minimisation, 
purpose limitation, etc). This means that data protection was understood in this context as a 
permissive tool that enables the exercise of power on the basis of certain principles. Indeed, 
data protection appears to legitimise the adoption of such schemes, as soon as these comply 
with some basic fair information principles even if they target the most vulnerable. 
Such interpretations cannot be accepted under an egalitarian theory. Data protection 
law should be able to both regulate and prohibit power.107 The problem is not how to 
construct such discriminatory schemes in order to comply with data protection principles; the 
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problem is that these are based on discriminatory assumptions and should be, therefore, 
prohibited as such. Data protection should no longer function only as an enabling tool for 
measures that violate its “essence”.108 It will merely set out “bureaucratic rules”109 with no 
real bite if it cannot call out and prohibit such measures for what they really are: 
discriminatory, unfairly targeting the most disadvantaged. A reconstructed egalitarian data 
protection should no longer provide the tools permitting such systems to be built on the basis 
of the fair information principles; it should be capable to recognise from the outset their 
disparate impact and — when they violate its essence — prohibit them.110  
 
C. Methods matter for an egalitarian data privacy 
 
An egalitarian data privacy project must pay adequate attention to the socio-economic, gender 
and intersectional exceptions of data protection in order to incorporate these in mainstream 
debates. This entails a task of “rethinking” data protection law “in relation to the socio-
economic, cultural [and] political, … crises that mark our time” and engaging in the ongoing 
“conversation about the relationship between law and society”.111 I submit that 
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methodological issues matter in this regard because “methods shape one’s view of the 
possibilities for legal practice and reform”.112 Method “organises the apprehension of truth; it 
determines what counts as evidence and defines what is taken as verification”.113  
 An egalitarian data privacy project needs to be oriented by context-sensitive methods 
that question the operation of EU data protection law and emphasise its “distributive 
stakes”114 and consequences. First, EU data protection should be re-positioned in its 
sociocultural and historical contexts.115 The lessons from history are fundamental for EU data 
protection law: the extensive and detailed repositories of personal data stored in government 
files (census data) and commercial databases (telephone and bank records) in Germany and 
the Netherlands allowed the Nazis to track down Jews and other “undesirables”.116  
Second, and perhaps more importantly, EU data privacy law should broaden its 
methodological perspectives by engaging and adapting the analytical, conceptual and 
empirical toolkits of research agendas and methods such as the “law and society” movement 
(LSM), Critical Legal Studies, Critical Race Theory and post-colonial legal studies.117 It is 
crucial to interrogate EU data protection law through different lenses: gender,118 intersectional 
feminist perspectives,119 critical race studies,120 critical disability studies,121 queer studies122 in 
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order to “critically revisit … epistemologies which underlie the conceptual frameworks now 
in circulation”.123 The employment of these methods can reveal “blind spots” in data 
protection laws that “fail to account for the inherent power asymmetries and structural 
disempowerment” of disadvantaged groups.124 For example, Germany and France do not, for 
historical reasons, collect any demographic data on ethnicity.125 However, such data might be 
necessary to tackle the racial and ethnic injustices deeply ingrained in our “colour-blind” 
societies.126 Data protection law cannot be used to justify the “data marginalisation”127 of 
groups affected by intersectional discrimination; it should provide the tools to safeguard their 
rights.      
Methods matter not only to identify the problematic distributive consequences of EU 
data protection law, but also to provide a more explicit recognition of the — often neglected 
— interests at stake when adjudicating relevant cases. As seen above, in SyRI the starting 
point of the court’s analysis was that social security is one of the pillars of the Dutch society 
and therefore benefit fraud must be combatted. Similarly, women that report rape in the 
United Kingdom must endure a humiliating “digital strip search” because “there is a 
widespread belief … encouraged by media headlines, that there are a vast number of false 
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allegations of sexual violence”.128 Both these assessments include the inherent assumption 
that diminished levels of data privacy are acceptable for disadvantaged groups on the grounds 
that these can be treated as suspects by default and, therefore, other interests are deemed more 
important than their data protection rights. Public policy objectives are considered in these 
cases the starting point of the analysis instead of the fundamental rights of the vulnerable 
groups affected. This clearly departs from art.52(1) of the EUCFR and established case law129 
according to which the starting point of the discussion should be the individual’s data privacy 
rights. A more forthright analysis making use of appropriate methods can give a fuller picture 
of the issues at stake, reject double standards and bring these cases in line with judgments 
concerning mass surveillance where the starting point of the analysis has been the primacy of 
data privacy rights. 
 Finally, methods can direct “the construction of new meanings”130 and understandings 
in EU data protection law that will guide appropriately the egalitarian project. For instance, 
data protection is based on the widely applauded concept of informational self-
determination.131 What are the consequences of this individualistic nature of data protection 
for vulnerable populations “who experience the intersection of multiple forms of 
subordination” and the combination of “high-tech”, “low-tech”, “virtual and physical 
surveillance”?132 Should they be expected to also navigate the complexity of data privacy law 
rules within the context of “corporate and government entanglements”133 regarding the 
collection and analysis of their personal information?  
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EU data protection law has over the years seen several celebrated successes as well as 
setbacks. Both, however, are predominantly centred around the CJEU’s case law and the 
eternal quest of data privacy to catch up with new technologies. This focus of EU data 
protection law has missed out fundamental questions about the socio-economic, gender and 
intersectional exceptions of this law. 
 The most vulnerable and disadvantaged groups are subjected to intensive monitoring 
and additional forms of surveillance and data protection has often been used as a permissive 
tool to allow this. This article argued that considering “What’s Next?” for the future of EU 
data protection should encompass questions such as “For Whom”? It called for a shift of 
paradigm in EU data protection law that should be more human-centric and societally 
focused.  
 If we are to seriously consider the future of EU data protection law, this should be 
reconstructed to pursue substantive equality goals. The egalitarian data protection project 
proposes a new normative orientation for data protection guided by methods that bring 
forward neglected perspectives and narratives and ensure its inclusivity and diversity. Only if 
EU data protection law is attentive to the inequalities that the most vulnerable face, it can 
remain relevant in the future. It is up to EU data privacy scholars to take the lead in this 
direction.     
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
